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ESSAY 
 
CLASS CERTIFICATION’S PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS 
KEVIN M. CLERMONT†
In September 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the controver-
sial Baycol litigation.  The central question will be whether, subsequent to a 
denial of class certification, preclusion can prevent an absentee from seeking to 
certify another class action on a similar claim.  This Essay answers that ques-
tion in the affirmative, while warning that the preclusion is very limited in 
scope.  It arrives at this answer by analogizing to the more established doctrine 
of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction:  if a court’s finding of no jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter or the person can preclude, then a finding of no au-
thority to proceed as a class action should be preclusive—but only on that pre-
cise issue of no authority. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A federal court denies certification of a plaintiff class action, the-
reby declaring the absentees to be nonparties.  One of those absentees 
then brings a class action on a similar claim in a different jurisdiction 
with an identical class action rule, provoking the common defendant 
to invoke res judicata.  Is the issue of certifiability subject to collateral 
estoppel?1  Academics might answer “no,”2
 
†
Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell University.  Thanks to Mike Dorf, Andrew Pollis, 
and Jay Tidmarsh for valuable comments. 
 on the ground that res ju-
1
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (stating the general rule 
of issue preclusion).  The cases speak only of collateral estoppel, but direct estoppel 
might be a more appropriate term here, as a certifiability issue will already have been 
litigated with respect to the same claim.  See id. § 17 cmt. c, § 27 cmt. b.  Better yet, as 
this Essay argues, one might invoke the separate res judicata doctrine called jurisdic-
tion to determine no jurisdiction.  See Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judi-
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dicata normally does not bind nonparties.3  But the courts generally 
answer “yes,”4 based on the idea that no reasons sufficiently justify re-
trying the same issue as long as the class representative adequately 
represented the absentee in the certification attempt.5  Now the U.S. 
Supreme Court stands poised to enter the fray via the controversial 
Baycol case.6
This Essay tackles Baycol’s central question of whether, after a 
denial of class certification, preclusion can reach an absentee.  Al-
though this question is central in many cases, only occasional class ac-
tions will present it cleanly.  On the one hand, many cases will fall 
beyond the reach of preclusion because some doctrinal requirement, 
as measured by the rendering court’s law,
 
7
 
cial Decisionmaking:  Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 19), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658931 (“A court should have authority to determine its 
lack of authority.  The initial court’s ruling that it lacks authority should prevent a 
second try that presents exactly the same issue.”). 
 is unmet.  First, only a final 
2
See, e.g., ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.11 (2010) 
(supporting a rebuttable presumption against aggregate treatment as a matter of comi-
ty, but rejecting collateral estoppel because absentees were not parties and because 
preclusion would therefore rest on forbidden virtual representation).  But see Kevin M. 
Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1016 (2006) (“And if the plaintiff 
refiles the case as a class action in state court, it is again subject to removal to federal 
court, where preclusion will presumably apply to both jurisdiction and certification 
issues.” (citing cautiously In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 
333 F.3d 763, 767-69 (7th Cir. 2003))). 
3
See ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA:  A HANDBOOK ON 
ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 149-69 (2001) (“As a general proposition, a 
judgment can bind only persons who were before the court.”). 
4
See, e.g., In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716, 724 (8th Cir.) (finding “that the 
parties against whom the rule is asserted are the same parties or parties in privity to 
those in the prior action and that their interests have been adequately represented”), 
cert. granted sub nom. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010); BRIAN ANDERSON & 
ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK 245 (2010).  But see J.R. Clearwater Inc. 
v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1996) (alternative holding) (“It is our 
considered view that the wide discretion inherent in the decision as to whether or not 
to certify a class dictates that each court—or at least each jurisdiction—be free to make 
its own determination in this regard.”). 
5
See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 3, at 29-38.  The same issue can arise from 
state court denials of certification.  Compare Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 607, 618-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (refusing preclusion, but in a case involving 
an earlier federal court denial), with Daboub v. Bell Gardens Bicycle Club, Inc., No. 
B200685, 2008 WL 4648797, at *4-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008) (applying preclusion 
by earlier state court denial and rejecting Johnson’s dictum). 
6
Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 61.  The Court held oral argument on January 18, 2011. 
7
See Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1014 (8th Cir. 2002); KEVIN M. 
CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.6 (2d ed. 2009) (recognizing, within 
limits, the ability of a sovereign to control the scope of the preclusive effects of its 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1715646
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judgment is binding.8  Second, only issues actually litigated and de-
termined in a manner essential to the judgment are binding.9  Third 
and most pertinently, the issues in the two suits must be the same, 
which is a requirement with a strict meaning that demands that the 
factual or legal issues be identical.10  Preclusion will extend neither to 
a new situation in which the facts have changed11 nor to another juris-
diction with a class action rule that differs in writing or in applica-
tion.12  On the other hand, some class action certification decisions 
can satisfy all these requirements of preclusion, a situation that pre-
vails more readily between courts in the same system, but possibly 
could arise between federal and state courts or between different 
states when certification presents itself identically under the second 
sovereign’s laws.13
This Essay assumes a certification decision satisfying those re-
quirements of preclusion.  Thereupon it cleanly asks whether the 
  Still, the central question may nevertheless sink to-
ward obscurity if matters such as interjurisdictional injunctive powers 
complicate the procedural setting. 
 
courts’ judgments); infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous 
choice of law for jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction).  In the case first discussed in 
the text below, the court correctly observed, but confusedly explained, that “federal 
law regarding collateral estoppel will be applied to the present case.”  Murray v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., No. 09-05744, 2010 WL 3490214, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010) (in-
volving a class action certification decision in a CAFA action); cf. In re Baycol, 593 F.3d 
at 721, 724 (incorporating state preclusion law as federal common law and calling in-
corporation the usual practice, but indicating that the court would not incorporate 
state law that was less preclusive than federal res judicata law).  On the governing law 
for ordinary res judicata, see generally Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
531 U.S. 497 (2001), and Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Sem-
tek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2003). 
8
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. g (1982); see also Kara M. 
Moorcroft, Note, The Path to Preclusion:  Federal Injunctive Relief Against Nationwide Classes 
in State Court, 54 DUKE L.J. 221, 239 (2004) (“[T]he certification decision seems ‘final’ 
enough for purposes of the relitigation exception.”).  As to finality, note that a class 
certification decision is now appealable, in the appellate court’s discretion, under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).  See generally Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueb-
lood, Rule 23(f):  A Note on Law and Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277 
(2008) (examining in detail the substance, origin, and application of the Rule). 
9
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); Moorcroft, supra note 8, at 
248-49. 
10
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982); Moorcroft, supra 
note 8, at 242-48. 
11
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982); CLERMONT, supra 
note 7, § 5.3, at 329, 332-33. 
12
See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 
F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (refusing to preclude a state court action involving a dif-
ferent class action rule). 
13
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. e (1982) (applying federal 
legal determinations to a state setting).  
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denial of certification in action A can, to any degree, preclude certifi-
cation in an action B brought by someone who was an adequately 
represented14
I.  LEADING CASES ON CERTIFICATION PRECLUSION 
 absentee in that prior action. 
A.  Murray v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
A straightforward presentation of the question arises when res ju-
dicata comes as a defense in the second class action.  In Murray v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,15 the plaintiff brought a statewide class action 
against Sears and Electrolux Home Products under California’s con-
sumer protection statutes.  The essential allegation was that Sears had 
marketed Electrolux’s laundry dryers using deceptive trade practices, 
which misrepresented the dryers as having a one-hundred-percent 
stainless steel drum when in fact the drum contained a nonstainless 
steel part.  The defendants removed under the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 (CAFA).16  Then, in their motion to deny certification, the 
defendants invoked collateral estoppel on the basis of a Seventh Cir-
cuit decision that had reversed the certification of a similar class ac-
tion against Sears alone.17
 
14
See In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“Here, the district court refused to grant class certification in the Bayshore Action be-
cause the Dealers failed to demonstrate that they would be adequate class representa-
tives, a prerequisite to certification under Rule 23(a)(4).  Once this decision was made, 
Westgate became a stranger to the Bayshore Action.”).  Thus, if the first court decides 
that the plaintiff does not satisfy Rule 23(a)(4), then the certification denial will not be 
preclusive.  Otherwise, the question of adequacy is open only on collateral attack and 
hence should be limited to due process adequacy.  See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN 
KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 
907-10 (10th ed. 2010) (discussing the screening role of Federal Rule 23 and its state 
counterparts).  The preclusion should extend, under a conservative approach, to all 
persons who were adequately represented with respect to the same issue and also were 
described as being within the proposed but rejected class.  Cf. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. 
v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983) (extending tolling “‘to all asserted members of 
the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a 
class action’” (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974))). 
 
15
No. 09-05744, 2010 WL 2898291 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010).  I am indebted to J. 
Russell Jackson, Preclusive Effect of Class Certification Denial, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 16, 2010, at 
26 (favoring application of res judicata), for drawing my attention to this case. 
16
28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006). 
17
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 06C1999, 2007 WL 3232491, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2007) (certifying this CAFA class action, which Sears had removed 
from Illinois state court), rev’d, 547 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.) (denying class 
action while incorrectly describing the case as an original federal action), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 90 (2009).  On remand, the district court retained jurisdiction over the indi-
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That Seventh Circuit decision, Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
had denied class certification for a multistate class action that would 
have included purchasers in California.  The appellate court had 
found “no common issues of law [or fact] because there did not ap-
pear to be a single understanding of the significance of labeling or 
advertising of the allegedly deceptive statements.”18  Instead, the court 
had characterized the concerns of the plaintiff—who had relied on an 
advertisement of the “stainless steel drums” to conclude that the 
drums would not leave rust stains on clothes—to be “idiosyncratic.”19
Although Martin Murray was neither a named plaintiff nor a wit-
ness in the Illinois federal class action, the federal district judge in 
California accepted the collateral estoppel argument of the two de-
fendants.  Thus, she denied class certification in the new class action.  
First, the judge found the requirements for issue preclusion were met.  
She found, in particular, the pertinent legal and factual issues to be 
identical, having recognized that estoppel would not apply unless the 
same issue arose in both suits.
 
20  Second, the judge rejected the plain-
tiff’s argument that he was a stranger to the prior action.21
 
vidual plaintiff’s action but dismissed it as moot after the plaintiff refused a full settle-
ment; the Seventh Circuit affirmed on February 12, 2010.  Thorogood v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 595 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.).  On remand, the district court 
discretionarily denied an injunction against bringing state class actions and left the de-
fendant to invoke collateral estoppel; the Seventh Circuit reversed on November 2, 
2010, holding Sears to be entitled to an injunction that would protect it from “settle-
ment extortion” in the form of plaintiffs’ pursuing extensive discovery and huge recov-
ery in class actions brought in multiple states.  Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
624 F.3d 842, 843, 848 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.) (characterizing “this third appeal 
[as] arising out of a near-frivolous class action suit by Steven Thorogood”). 
  Admitted-
ly, collateral estoppel required adequate representation in the prior 
18
Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 2010) (summarizing the 
Thorogood decision). 
19
Thorogood, 547 F.3d at 747. 
20
See Murray, 2010 WL 2898291, at *4 (finding that the issues were sufficiently 
identical in the Thorogood action to justify collateral estoppel).  Mr. Murray subsequent-
ly amended the complaint to avoid collateral estoppel by convincing the court that his 
action had become sufficiently different from Thorogood.  See Murray v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., No. 09-05744, 2010 WL 3490214, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010).  But that non-
appealable success prompted the Seventh Circuit to enjoin Mr. Murray’s further pur-
suit of the class action in California.  See Thorogood, 624 F.3d at 854 (deciding that the 
amended complaint still fell within the reach of collateral estoppel because it pre-
sented the same issue of commonality), reh’g denied, 627 F.3d 289, 292-93 (7th Cir. 
2010) (rejecting a petition that attacked “the Panel’s role as the self-assured Simon 
Cowell of the Circuits”).  That outcome left the Murray plaintiff in the position of filing 
an amicus brief in the Baycol litigation.  See Brief of Steven J. Thorogood & Martin 
Murray as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61 
(2010) (No. 09-1205). 
21
Murray, 2010 WL 2898291, at *5. 
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suit, but the judge found that Murray had received adequate repre-
sentation in Illinois because (1) the Illinois district court had so found 
in certifying the class;22 (2) the parties in California had not “seriously 
contested” the point, presumably because the plaintiff’s counsel clear-
ly had done an adequate job;23 and (3) the same lead counsel had 
brought both actions, even if this made the second class action “ap-
pear to be an example of ‘deliberate maneuvering to avoid the effects 
of’ Thorogood.”24
B.  In re Baycol Products Litigation 
 
The same question of preclusion can arise in connection with an in-
junction in the first court prohibiting putative class members from 
bringing new class actions.  That situation describes the Baycol litigation, 
coming out of the Eighth Circuit and now before the Supreme Court.25
Here the first class action involved plaintiff George McCollins 
seeking in 2001 to represent a West Virginia class against the makers 
of Baycol, an anticholesterol drug.  The defendants removed on the 
basis of diversity.  The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consoli-
dated the action with thousands of similar cases in the District of Minne-
sota for pretrial proceedings.
 
26
 
22
See id.  The Murray court relied on the district court’s certification in Thorogood, 
2007 WL 3232491, at *3.  This alternative holding in Murray is a suspect application of 
collateral estoppel against the victorious party.  See LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic Transp. Co., 
865 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1988) (dictum) (“[A] finding which a party had no incen-
tive (other than fear of collateral estoppel) to appeal, because he won, has no collater-
al estoppel effect.”); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 
  In 2008, upon the defendants’ motion, 
3, at 139.  Moreover, it rests on a 
finding rendered nonessential by reversal.  See id. at 127-29.  But the earlier case of In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation, 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 
2003), had likewise looked to just such a flimsy finding of adequacy.  Indeed, In re Bay-
col Products Litigation, 593 F.3d 716, 724-25 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Smith v. 
Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010), took this dangerous approach further by looking to 
the prior court’s assumption of adequacy in the course of denying certification for lack 
of commonality.  Even putting these basic mistakes in applying res judicata aside, there 
remains the more fundamental concern of using a finding of adequate representation 
to cut off an attack for inadequate representation.  See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1148 (1998); Patrick Woolley, Collateral Attack and the Role of Adequate Representation 
in Class Suits for Money Damages, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 917 (2010). 
23
Murray, 2010 WL 2898291, at *5. 
24
Id. (quoting Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 1998)).  Later 
the Seventh Circuit found that the representation in fact “was adequate (it was ener-
getic and pertinacious to a fault).”  Thorogood, 624 F.3d at 853. 
25
In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716 (8th Cir.) (Murphy, J.), cert. granted sub 
nom. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010). 
26
Id. at 720. 
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the presiding judge denied certification for McCollins’s class, pointing to 
the predominance of individual issues of showing harm or injury.27
Two of the absentees, Smith and Sperlazza, had brought the 
second class action in West Virginia state court in late 2001.
 
28  They 
sought to represent a West Virginia class and made allegations similar 
to McCollins’s, but structured the action to defeat diversity.29
Defendant Bayer Corporation then moved in the District of Min-
nesota to enjoin Smith and Sperlazza from relitigating the certifica-
tion issue in the West Virginia state court.  The federal district court 
granted the injunction.
  They 
moved for certification in the state court in late 2008. 
30  Although granting an injunction raises is-
sues concerning the Anti-Injunction Act31 as well as the existence of 
personal jurisdiction over the absentees sufficient to enjoin them,32 
the central issue—and the concern of this Essay—remains the permis-
sibility of precluding absentees.33
 
27
In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 453, 456-58 (D. Minn. 2008).  The judge 
also granted summary judgment against McCollins on his individual claim, because 
McCollins sought only refunds for economic loss and failed to show that Baycol was 
different from what he had bargained for.  Id. at 458-60.  There was no appeal. 
  “The district court’s injunction was 
28
In re Baycol, 593 F.3d at 720. 
29
Again, the Eighth Circuit took a lax approach to the requirements of res judica-
ta.  See supra note 22.  Here the second action had some different allegations, such as 
adding a claim for fraud, but the court brushed this point aside.  “The same cause of 
action framed in terms of a new legal theory is still the same cause of action.”  In re Bay-
col, 593 F.3d at 723 n.5 (quoting Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1015 (8th 
Cir. 2002)).  But the Canady court was discussing claim preclusion.  The Baycol court 
picked up this faulty argument directly from the defendant’s brief.  See Brief of Defen-
dant-Appellee Bayer Corp. at 24, In re Baycol, 593 F.3d 716 (No. 09-1069).  However, 
the defendant seemed to back away from this argument in its Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Certiorari at 19-20, Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010) (No. 09-
1205) (suggesting that issue preclusion—not claim preclusion—is presented in Smith), 
and abandoned it in the Brief for Respondent at 30-31, Smith, 131 S. Ct. 61 (No. 09-
1205) (arguing directly that the issue was the same). 
30
In re Baycol Prods. Litig., No. 02-0199, 2008 WL 7425712, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 
9, 2008). 
31
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006). 
32
Compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-14 (1985) (requiring 
some equivalent of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state class members), with In re 
Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (finding that absentees could not be subjected to the court’s injunctive 
power for lack of minimum contacts). 
33
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Smith v. Bayer on these obscurely 
phrased questions: 
1.  Among the elements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be used in 
support of the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act are require-
ments that the state parties sought to be estopped are the same parties or in 
privity with parties to the prior federal litigation and that issues necessary to 
the resolution of the proceedings are also identical.  In determining whether 
210 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 203 
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proper if collateral estoppel would bar respondents from seeking cer-
tification of a West Virginia economic loss class in state court.”34
The Eighth Circuit affirmed.  It conceded that Smith and Sperlaz-
za had not received notice or an opportunity to opt out because 
McCollins’s class had never attained certification, but held that 
McCollins had adequately represented them.
 
35  Smith and Sperlazza 
had enjoyed the opportunities to intervene and to appeal.36  If left 
unbound, absentees could keep trying for certification until they got 
some anomalous court to certify—perhaps in a nationwide class action 
that would erase all the prior losses—even though a contrary decision 
on certification would have bound the defendants.37  Finally, the dis-
pute involved whether to bind the two new plaintiffs on certification, 
not on the merits.  Smith and Sperlazza “are still free to pursue indi-
vidual claims in state court. . . . The protections available to [them] in 
the context of an adverse certification ruling include their right to 
adequate representation, their ability to appeal, and the fact that the 
decision still allows them to pursue their individual claims.”38
 
issues are identical, courts have also recognized that state courts should have 
discretion to apply their own procedural rules in a manner different from 
their federal counterparts.  Can the district court’s injunction be affirmed 
when neither the parties sought to be estopped nor the issues presented are 
identical? 
 
2.  It is axiomatic that everyone should have his own day in court and that one 
is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he has not 
been made a party by designation or service of process.  One exception to this 
rule are absent members of a class in a properly conducted class action be-
cause of the due-process protections accorded such absent members once 
class certification has been granted.  Does a district court have personal juris-
diction over absent members of a class for purposes of enjoining them from 
seeking class certification in state court when a properly conducted class ac-
tion had never existed before the district court because it had denied class 
certification and due-process protections had never been afforded the absent 
members? 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Smith, 131 S. Ct. 61 (No. 09-1205). 
34
In re Baycol, 593 F.3d at 721. 
35
Id. at 724-25; see also supra note 22. 
36
In re Baycol, 593 F.3d at 725. 
37
See id. (noting that Smith and Sperlazza “would have been included in a certi-
fied class in this case”); see also id. at 723-24 (“Relitigation in state court of whether to 
certify the same class rejected by a federal court presented an impermissible ‘heads-I-
win, tails-you-lose situation.’” (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2003))). 
38
Id. at 725.  Actually, all of the points in this paragraph of text, except for ade-
quacy of representation, appeared in the court’s discussion of the first court’s personal 
jurisdiction over the absentees, justifying the conclusion that “[t]hese safeguards satisfy 
due process and are sufficient to bind them in personam to the district court’s certifi-
2011] Class Certification’s Preclusive Effects 211 
The Supreme Court may very well reverse for, say, lack of authori-
ty to enjoin, or even for inadequacy of representation39 or failure to 
satisfy the same-issue requirement.40
C.  In re Bridgestone/Firestone 
  The concern of this Essay, how-
ever, is the correctness of the Eighth Circuit’s extension of preclusion 
to the absentees. 
In affirming the Baycol injunction, the Eighth Circuit relied heavi-
ly on the granddaddy of precedent in this area, In re Bridges-
tone/Firestone.41  Leading up to that “unprecedented decision,”42 the 
Bridgestone/Firestone district court had certified a nationwide class ac-
tion based on diversity jurisdiction and alleging defects in many mod-
els of tires, but the Seventh Circuit had reversed for unmanageabili-
ty.43  After the filing of many follow-up class actions around the 
country, the defendants asked the district court to enjoin all such class 
actions.  The district court denied the motion and the Seventh Circuit 
reversed again, ruling that the district court should enjoin pursuit of 
all duplicative nationwide class actions, but not any statewide class ac-
tions with their different manageability concerns.44  The district court 
then did so.45
 
cation decision.”  Id.  But the Eighth Circuit relied here on the discussion of Bridges-
tone/Firestone, which appeared to be addressing preclusion, rather than personal juris-
diction.  See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768 (“[U]nnamed class members 
have the status of parties for many purposes and are bound by the decision whether or 
not the court otherwise would have had personal jurisdiction over them.”); see also infra 
Part IV (discussing preclusion and jurisdiction’s similarities and differences). 
 
39
See supra notes 14 & 22. 
40
See supra notes 12 & 29. 
41
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 763. 
42
Moorcroft, supra note 8, at 238 (arguing in favor of the decision as protect-
ing federal courts from state intrusion); see also id. at 235 n.75 (discussing the no-
velty of Bridgestone/Firestone’s approach). 
43
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. 
Ind. 2001), rev’d, 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1105 (2003). 
44
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769; see also Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 624 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir. 2010) (confirming the Bridgestone/Firestone precedent); 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide 
Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2117 (2008) (favoring issuance of such injunc-
tions and arguing that “due process imposes no obstacle to a federal order enforcing a 
denial of certification”).  But see Timothy Kerr, Cleaning Up One Mess to Create Another:  
Duplicative Class Actions, Federal Courts’ Injunctive Power, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 233 (2006) (arguing that issuing an injunction based 
on a decision not to certify a class “is an incorrect application of preclusion law”). 
45
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 
1080 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s language in ordering that “‘all 
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II.  APPROACHING THE CENTRAL QUESTION 
A.  The American Law Institute’s Route 
The American Law Institute explicitly rejects Bridgestone/Firestone.46  
The ALI’s blackletter provides:  “A judicial decision to deny aggregate 
treatment for a common issue or for related claims by way of a class 
action should raise a rebuttable presumption against the same aggre-
gate treatment in other courts as a matter of comity.”47
 The choice of comity rather than preclusion as the focus of this Sec-
tion stems from the difficulties associated with the latter with respect to a 
denial of class certification.  The major difficulty arises from the recogni-
tion that, as to such a denial, the prospective absent class members have 
become neither parties to the proposed class action nor persons with any 
attributes of party status (such as the capacity to be bound thereby, as in 
a duly certified class action).  Nor is there any guarantee that prospective 
absent class members even would be aware of the court’s determination 
of their ability to assert claims as a class action.  The notion that absent 
class members could be bound in an issue-preclusion sense with respect 
to the seeking of certification in another court, even for the same pro-
posed class action, runs afoul of existing precedents that confine to cer-
tain narrowly defined categories the situations in which preclusion can be 
extended to reach nonparties.  Issue preclusion arising from a denial of 
class certification as to would-be absent class members would approach the 
kind of “virtual representation” disallowed under current law.
  Having chosen 
to rest this presumption on comity rather than preclusion, the ALI re-
fers to “due-process limitations” in the accompanying comment while 
explaining: 
48
I assume that the ALI is not resorting to some abstract party/nonparty 
line.
 
49
 
members of the putative national classes . . . , and their lawyers,’ are hereby prohibited 
‘from again attempting to have nationwide classes certified over defendants’ opposi-
tion with respect to the same claims’” (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 
769)). 
  It is instead asking whether absentees can and should be 
46
See ALI, supra note 2, § 2.11 reporters’ note cmt. b (arguing that the Bridges-
tone/Firestone court went beyond “the outer bounds for nonparty preclusion”).  
47
Id. § 2.11. 
48
Id. § 2.11 cmt. b; see also id. reporters’ note cmt. b (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 
U.S. 880 (2008), for the rejection of the “virtual representation” principle). 
49
See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2002) (“Nonnamed class members, 
however, may be parties for some purposes and not for others.  The label ‘party’ does 
not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability 
of various procedural rules that may differ based on context.”).  For example, the 
court theoretically can subject nonnamed class members to discovery as if they were 
parties, even before certification.  See Joseph H. Park, Precertification, in A PRACTITION-
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treated as privies.  Reasonable people could certainly disagree over 
whether such a step would optimize class certification’s preclusive ef-
fects.  Nonetheless, in my opinion, the ALI’s position—or rather its 
implication—is wrong in two other respects. 
First, the ALI should not be invoking, however obliquely, the Due 
Process Clause as a barrier to preclusion.  Our law on a judgment’s 
preclusive reach as to nonparties does not come close to raising due 
process concerns.  Res judicata law comprises society’s decision on 
how far to go with nonparty preclusion, and society has decided to re-
strict its reach well short of where due process would step in to prohi-
bit preclusion.50
This argument against the ALI begins by defining privy as a label 
for those persons who were nonparties to an action but who are never-
theless subject to generally the same rules of res judicata as are the 
former parties.  The authorization for this treatment lies in some sort 
of representational relationship that existed between the nonparty 
and a former party.  In invoking that authorization to specify which 
nonparties to consider privies, res judicata law demands that the poli-
cy reasons for binding the nonparty substantially outweigh the social 
costs.  Indeed, of the various kinds of nonparties who are candidates 
for privity, the law designates only those who fall within a set of clear, 
simple, and rigid rules that together approximate the outcome of that 
balancing of benefits and costs.  Moreover, because the various kinds 
of privies differ widely, and especially in the nature of the relationship 
of privy to party, qualifications and exceptions start sprouting up with 
respect to the binding effects of the judgment in order to reflect the 
privity relationship’s decreasing intensity.
 
51
The preclusion of nonparties under res judicata law “does not 
contravene the Constitution, because all that due process guarantees 
is a full and fair day in court enjoyed in person or through a representa-
tive.”
 
52  Due process, always reasonable and realistic, therefore allows 
binding many more nonparties than one might assume.53
 
ER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 3, 11-12 (Marcy Hogan Greer ed., 2010) (noting the ex-
istence, but rare invocation, of federal courts’ power to do so). 
  In this 
realm, due process itself requires only “adequate representation”—
50
See Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that ade-
quate representation may satisfy due process but is not enough to create privity). 
51
 See CLERMONT, supra note 7, § 5.4, at 339-41. 
52
Id. at 339. 
53
Id.  The Supreme Court’s seemingly more demanding decisions that have ex-
pressed a right-to-a-day-in-court theme were interpreting statutes or rules or subconsti-
tutional doctrine, not the Due Process Clause.  See generally Robert G. Bone, Rethinking 
the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992). 
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such that, for class actions, the absentees actually agreed with a named 
party as to general objectives and the party vigorously and competently 
pursued those objectives, as measured by the outcome of that representa-
tion.54
To summarize this response to the ALI’s first error, a court’s 
judgment could constitutionally bind all persons whose interests re-
ceived adequate representation; a court could bind them not only 
through the flexible doctrine of stare decisis, but also through the 
strictures of res judicata.  Society, however, chooses to bind nonparties 
by judgment in a narrower fashion—and expresses this choice in its 
res judicata law.  Res judicata binds “only those nonparties closely re-
lated to the representative party or, as the law phrases it, those in priv-
ity with the party.”
 
55
Second, by its reference to virtual representation, the ALI signaled 
its heavy reliance on the intervening precedent of Taylor v. Sturgell.
  That is, privity requires adequate representation 
plus something else.  That something might be a relationship suffi-
ciently ensuring alignment and protection of interests, or some sort of 
affirmative conduct signifying consent to representation.  The ques-
tion before us, then, is one of res judicata, not one of due process. 
56  
The ALI’s deliberations had started with a draft that provided for issue 
preclusion.57  Taylor led the ALI to reconsider this draft:  “Informed by 
the Taylor Court’s analysis of the outer bounds for nonparty preclu-
sion, this Section rejects the Bridgestone/Firestone court’s pre-Taylor view 
of the issue-preclusive effect that may properly flow from a denial of 
class certification.”58  Although the ALI was wise to look to a precedent 
that refined privity rather than exploring due process,59
 
54
See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1789 (3d ed. 2005) (“[A] judgment in a class or representative action may bind 
members of the class who were not parties to the suit provided their interests were 
adequately represented.”).  See generally Woolley, supra note 
 it was wrong 
22, at 921-49 (discussing 
the function and contours of the adequacy of representation requirement). 
55
CLERMONT, supra note 7, § 5.4, at 339. 
56
553 U.S. 880, 900 (2008) (holding that federal res judicata law does not bind on 
the basis of virtual representation, but instead requires, in addition to alignment of 
interests, that “either the party understood herself to be acting in a representative ca-
pacity or the original court took care to protect the interests of the nonparty”). 
57
See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.12 (Discussion 
Draft 2006) (“A judicial decision to deny aggregate treatment for a common issue 
should have issue-preclusive effect as to the bases for that decision in other 
courts . . . .”). 
58
ALI, supra note 2, § 2.11 reporters’ note cmt. b. 
59
See FIELD ET AL., supra note 14, at 760-61 (summarizing and excerpting the Tay-
lor case to focus on privity). 
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to view Taylor as forbidding res judicata’s application to a denial of class 
action certification.  Taylor counsels caution in extending res judicata, 
but it does not forbid its application in the Bridgestone/Firestone situation. 
Taylor recognized that “the rule against nonparty preclusion is 
subject to exceptions”60—albeit quite limited and rigidly defined ex-
ceptions.61  The ALI read that recognition very cautiously:  “The Court 
hastened to underscore, however, that those exceptions ‘delineate 
discrete’ situations that ‘apply in “limited circumstances,”’ none of 
which extend generally to the situation of a would-be absent class 
member with respect to a denial of class certification.”62  The better 
reading of Taylor is that it stands for a conservative approach to creat-
ing extensions to privity and sets up some minimum requirements for 
them,63
How much nonparty preclusion does Taylor permit?  Privies in-
clude persons whom a party actually represented in the litigation, thus 
including beneficiaries represented by a trustee or executor, as well as 
class action members adequately represented by their class represent-
ative.
 but that it does not rule out looking among the existing cate-
gories of privies for one that includes a seemingly new situation. 
64
 
60
Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893.  
  Yet privity does not reach all persons adequately represented by 
parties.  Taylor held that preclusion does not extend to virtual repre-
sentation, which entails merely common interests shared by party and 
61
See id. at 901 (“Preclusion doctrine, it should be recalled, is intended to reduce 
the burden of litigation on courts and parties.  ‘In this area of the law,’ we agree, ‘crisp 
rules with sharp corners are preferable to a round-about doctrine of opaque stan-
dards.’” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bittinger v. Tecum-
seh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877, 881 (6th Cir. 1997))). 
62
ALI, supra note 2, § 2.11 reporters’ note cmt. b (quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 898 
(quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989))). 
63
See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 900-01 (reviewing the recognized extensions of privity 
resting on adequate representation).  In a critical passage, the Taylor Court identified 
the following required protections, which are at least “grounded in due process”:  
A party’s representation of a nonparty is “adequate” for preclusion purposes 
only if, at a minimum:  (1) the interests of the nonparty and her representa-
tive are aligned, see Hansberry [v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940)]; and (2) either 
the party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the 
original court took care to protect the interests of the nonparty, see Richards 
[v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1996)] . . . .  In addition, adequate 
representation sometimes requires (3) notice of the original suit to the per-
sons alleged to have been represented, see Richards, 517 U.S., at 801.  In the 
class-action context, these limitations are implemented by the procedural sa-
feguards contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.   
Id.  
64
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 41–42 (1982). 
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nonparty.65
Just as the answer to this central question does not lie in the Due 
Process Clause, it does not lie in a reference to Taylor.  The answer in-
stead lies in deciding whether the law should choose to treat the ab-
sentees as privies.  And that choice rests on policy and precedent. 
  Instead, the required relationship must be closer.  Taylor 
thus drew a line.  The task is to determine on which side of the line 
adequately represented absentees fall with respect to a class action 
certification denial. 
B.  Delineating the Reach of Privity 
As conceded above, reasonable people may disagree over how, 
from a policy perspective, class certification’s preclusive effects may be 
optimized based on costs and benefits.  The cases above developed the 
arguments on the two sides. 
Before assessing the costs and benefits, one should recognize 
anew that the dispute over preclusion in the subsequent class action 
concerns preclusion as to certification rather than as to the merits.  
The absentee does not risk losing the individual claim, but only the 
“right” to bring a class action.66
Proponents of preclusion argue that it would be, on balance, effi-
cient and fair because preclusion (1) avoids wasteful relitigation and 
inconsistent adjudications, as it extends the power of the rendering 
court to dispose of the dispute; (2) provides repose and protects re-
liance interests; and (3) is fairer to class action defendants in that it 
(a) avoids imposing the burdens of relitigating, (b) prevents absentees 
from searching for the anomalous court that will certify the class, and 
(c) treats putative class members the same as the defendant. 
  However, that right is one that be-
longs to society; it is not a property interest of any one individual.  So-
ciety should have concerns when everyone loses in advance the right 
to bring a class action, but society should worry less after someone has 
litigated the propriety of a class action for a particular set of claims.  In-
deed, society could defensibly conclude that absentees lose the “privi-
lege” (and windfall returns) of bringing a class action after an adequate 
representative has unsuccessfully litigated the class certification ques-
tion.  Putting that qualification aside and assuming adequate represen-
tation in the initial class action, the two sides’ arguments run as follows. 
 
65
Taylor, 553 U.S. at 901. 
66
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 44-50; Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Par-
ticipation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (2010). 
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Opponents of preclusion argue that nonpreclusion would be, on 
balance, efficient and fair because it (1) allows a fresh look in pursuit 
of the right result, although the availability of nonmutual issue preclu-
sion against the defendant means that the wrong result as to certifica-
tion might come to prevail; and (2) is fairer to absentees, who did not 
receive notice or an opportunity to opt out, even if they had the op-
portunities to intervene and to appeal. 
Thus, the argument for preclusion is not insubstantial at all.67  It 
explains the weight of precedent favoring preclusion.  Even the ALI 
agreed as to policy by conceding:  “Short of issue preclusion . . . the 
court in the subsequent proceeding should generally exercise its dis-
cretion to avoid unnecessary friction with the court that initially de-
nied class certification.”68
Nevertheless, the costs on neither side are readily quantifiable.  If 
a court eyed these costs without a proplaintiff or prodefendant bias, 
and without any unauthorized policy bias that favors or disfavors class 
actions, the court could not say with definitiveness which side has the 
stronger argument.  Taylor did urge courts not to make close cost-
benefit calls in favor of nonparty preclusion.
 
69
There is, however, a route around Taylor, one that courts and par-
ties have yet to discover.  Blazing that path requires finding an ana-
logous provision among the existing categories of precluded privies—
or parties whose treatment resembles that of privies.  The analogy in-
volves the res judicata law that treats jurisdictional findings. 
  Thus, as the ALI con-
cluded, Taylor counsels against creating a new category of privies to 
extend the preclusive effect of the denial of class action certification 
to absentees. 
 
67
See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5-10, Smith, 131 S. Ct. 61 (No. 09-1205) (de-
veloping the argument for preclusion); Moorcroft, supra note 8, at 223-29 (developing 
a similar argument). 
68
ALI, supra note 2, § 2.11 cmt. b.  The ALI’s reliance on comity would not, how-
ever, provide sufficient assurance against relitigation.  Stare decisis fails as well when 
the second class action is outside the domain of the first court. 
69
See, e.g., 553 U.S. at 906 (noting that, under similar circumstances, “courts 
should be cautious about finding preclusion”). 
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III.  A JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION’S PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS70
A.  Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction 
 
The doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction treats a mat-
ter somewhat different from the normal application of res judicata: it 
does not involve preclusive use of determinations embedded in a valid 
judgment, but instead involves preclusive use of prior determinations 
underlying a judgment in order to establish the judgment’s validity.  
That is to say, an affirmative ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction, ter-
ritorial jurisdiction, or adequate notice can foreclose relitigation of 
that ruling—and thereby preclude the parties from attacking the re-
sultant judgment by raising that ground in subsequent litigation.71
It is true that if a defendant faces suit in a court that lacks jurisdic-
tion or fails to give notice, the defendant ordinarily does not have to 
respond in any way.  If the defendant takes no action of any kind in 
response to the suit, the court may enter a default judgment, but the 
judgment will be invalid.  If the plaintiff should attempt to assert 
rights based on that judgment in a later suit involving the same de-
fendant, the defendant ordinarily can avoid the effects of the judg-
ment by showing that its entry was without jurisdiction or notice.  The 
defendant, in person or through a representative, has the right to a 
day in some court on the question of the fundamental authority of the 
court that rendered the earlier judgment.
 
72
Alternatively, the defendant may choose to raise the jurisdiction 
or notice issue in the initial action by going before the challenged 
court itself.  Then, the court that otherwise lacks authority could con-
ceivably have jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction and 
whether its notice was good, and its affirmative rulings on such ques-
tions could bind the defendant so as to preclude relitigation of the 
same questions.  The theory would be that because the essential issue 
of jurisdiction or notice was actually litigated and determined, even if 
erroneously, the defendant should not be allowed to relitigate the 
same issue in subsequent litigation.  The defendant’s appearance in 
the challenged court would then be the defendant’s day in court on 
 
 
70
This Part draws heavily from CLERMONT, supra note 7, § 5.1, and Clermont, su-
pra note 1, at 16-21. 
71
See generally CLERMONT, supra note 7, §§ 4.4, 5.1(A)(3); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
& MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 16, at 95-96 (6th ed. 2002) (“If the juris-
diction of a federal court is questioned, the court has the power, subject to review, to 
determine the jurisdictional issue.”). 
72
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 65–66 (1982). 
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the question of the forum’s authority; the defendant could obtain ap-
pellate review of the erroneous ruling, of course, but could not chal-
lenge it by later seeking relief from judgment.73
Our law, in fact, accepts this so-called bootstrap principle, and so 
allows a court lacking fundamental authority to issue a judgment that 
will nevertheless be immune from attack in subsequent litigation.
 
74  
Here the desire for finality outweighs the concern for validity.  Indeed, 
our law accepts the bootstrap principle’s value of finality with true en-
thusiasm, despite its conflict with the intuitive value of validity.75
Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction constitutes a third body of 
res judicata law, distinguishable from claim and issue preclusion, or 
perhaps standing separate from res judicata.  In particular, despite a 
similar appearance, it differs importantly from issue preclusion.
 
76
 
73
This principle has been widely acknowledged.  See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 
106, 116 (1963) (quasi in rem jurisdiction); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 589 
(1951) (jurisdiction over status); Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 
U.S. 371, 378 (1940) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling 
Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931) (personal jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 10–12 (1982). 
  The 
74
See Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap:  Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 494-99 (1967) (describing the doctrine and 
its operation). 
75
Our law applies the principle even more broadly than the foregoing illustration 
of actually-litigated-and-determined forum-authority defenses.  Strangely, this exten-
sion comes in connection with subject-matter jurisdiction, in spite of the traditional 
lore about subject-matter jurisdiction’s fundamental importance.  On the one hand, an 
implicit determination of the unchallenged existence of subject-matter jurisdiction in 
any action litigated to judgment by contesting parties has the preclusive consequences 
of an actually litigated determination in foreclosing attack on the judgment.  See, e.g., 
Chicot Cty., 308 U.S. at 378 (precluding a defaulted defendant from collateral attack on 
subject-matter jurisdiction grounds, after other defendants had appeared and litigated 
the case without raising subject-matter jurisdiction and after the prior court had can-
celed the defendants’ bonds); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982).  
On the other hand, sometimes the interests inherent in subject-matter jurisdiction are 
too important to ignore; even an express finding of subject-matter jurisdiction will not 
preclude the parties from attacking the resultant judgment on that ground in special 
circumstances, such as where the court plainly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or 
where the judgment substantially infringes on the authority of another court or agency.  
See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439 (1940) (holding that a state court proceeding 
could not preclude a bankruptcy proceeding); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 12 cmts. c, e (1982); Karen Nelson Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter Juris-
diction:  A Critique of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 534, 
543 (1981) (“[T]here is no substantial reason to depart from the application of general 
res judicata principles to collateral attacks upon subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
76
For a fuller discussion of the differences between the doctrines, see CLERMONT, 
supra note 7, § 5.1(A)(3), at 307: 
First, issue preclusion requires a valid prior judgment.  Jurisdiction to deter-
mine jurisdiction does not require validity, but instead works to make invul-
nerable what could otherwise be an invalid judgment.  Second, issue preclu-
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reason for difference is that the conflicting policies that shape the 
doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction are unique, and so 
they produce a unique set of rules.  For related reasons tied to the no-
tion that this doctrine defines the judgment even more intimately 
than does the rest of res judicata, the federal common law of jurisdic-
tion to determine jurisdiction applies to a prior federal judgment.77
B.  Jurisdiction to Determine No Jurisdiction
 
78
Can a court’s ruling that it lacks jurisdiction have preclusive ef-
fect?  Courts and scholars have elaborated this question less thorough-
ly than the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine, and thus 
the details of its answer remain more controversial.  Nevertheless, it is 
clear that there exists, at least to some degree, a doctrine of jurisdic-
tion to determine no jurisdiction. 
 
In elaborating the related doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court built upon the premise of a jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine. In Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil 
Co.,79
 
sion applies only in a subsequent action, and so does not apply on a motion 
for relief from judgment, which is technically a continuation of the initial ac-
tion.  Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, however, does apply to preclude a 
validity attack by such a motion, as well as by the other methods for relief from 
judgment.  Third, issue preclusion usually does not work to bind the party 
prevailing on the issue.  Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction will preclude 
the successful plaintiff if the unsuccessful defendant would be precluded on 
the jurisdiction or notice issue.  Fourth, issue preclusion applies only to issues 
actually litigated and determined.  Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction 
sometimes applies to issues of subject-matter jurisdiction that were not liti-
gated at all, and even against a defaulting party.  Fifth, and most importantly, 
special policies and concerns are at work with respect to the jurisdiction and 
notice defenses, so the law needs to develop special rules and exceptions for 
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. 
 the federal district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.  The understanding was that the personal jurisdiction decision 
would have a binding effect, so as to prevent the plaintiff from suing 
77
See Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 396-98 (5th Cir. 
2001) (discussing the choice-of-law principles to apply under these circumstances, 
while distinguishing Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001)).  
78
See CLERMONT, supra note 7, § 4.4(B)(3), at 297 (“Passing beyond the res judica-
ta effects of affirmative rulings on forum-authority, what if the initial court decides that 
it lacks jurisdiction or failed to give notice?  That is, can a court, which is admittedly 
without authority to enter a valid judgment, make any rulings that have preclusive ef-
fect?  Yes.”). 
79
526 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1999) (holding that a federal court can skip over a subject-
matter jurisdiction defense to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction); see also Clermont, 
supra note 1, at 21-31 (delineating nonbypassable and resequenceable defenses). 
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repetitively.  The parties as well as the Justices on oral argument as-
sumed the existence of some intersystem preclusion.80  The Court it-
self clearly envisaged intersystem preclusion, just as Justice Ginsburg 
suggested in her opinion for the unanimous Court:  “If a federal court 
dismisses a removed case for want of personal jurisdiction, that de-
termination may preclude the parties from relitigating the very same 
personal jurisdiction issue in state court.”81
Moreover, intersystem preclusion was a necessary implication of 
Ruhrgas’s holding, because allowing the Texas state court to reconsid-
er the federal courts’ decision on personal jurisdiction would under-
cut the Court’s decision extending hypothetical jurisdiction.  Preclu-
sion was also necessary because otherwise the judgment would mean 
almost nothing.  As Justice Ginsburg declared during oral argument, 
“[t]he Federal court would be accomplishing nothing [if it did not] 
bind the State court.”
 
82  Accordingly, under the federal preclusion law 
applicable to a federal judgment, the federal judgment in the defen-
dant’s favor would prevent later suit in a Texas state court for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.83
Indeed, a court should have authority to determine its own lack of 
authority.  The initial court’s ruling that it lacks authority should pre-
vent a second try that presents exactly the same issue.  The initial rul-
ing will defeat jurisdiction in any attempt to sue again in a second 
court where the same jurisdictional issue arises,
 
84
 
80
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 8-9, 13, 30-31, Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574 (No. 
98-470), 1999 WL 183813 (suggesting that the issue was one of potential conflict be-
tween federal and Texas state courts). 
 even when one court 
81
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (citing Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 
U.S. 522, 524-27 (1931), with the parenthetical to Baldwin that “personal jurisdiction 
ruling has issue-preclusive effect”). 
82
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80, at 9. 
83
See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 4436 & n.33 (2d ed. 2002) (collecting cases); cf. Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of 
Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21 (2001) (noting 
the novelty of the Ruhrgas approach); David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade:  
Some Thoughts About Her Contributions in the Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 21, 30 (2004) (finding some “difficulty with [the] reasoning” in Ruhrgas).  
84
See, e.g., Coors Brewing Co. v. Méndez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(noting the preclusive effect of the jurisdictional determination and highlighting its 
contrast with other preclusion doctrines), abrogated on other grounds, Levin v. Commerce 
Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010); Hill v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(identifying jurisdictional determinations as “an important and applicable exception” 
to the rule that dismissals without prejudice are not preclusive); Bromwell v. Mich. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 208, 212-13 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Once the [district] court deter-
mined that it lacked jurisdiction . . . that determination had a preclusive effect.”); 
Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same). 
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is state and the other federal.85  One argument for assigning at least 
this minimal preclusive effect to a court’s ruling as to jurisdiction is 
that leaving it with no preclusive effect might raise the constitutional 
problem associated with advisory opinions.86
Naturally, there should be limits to the preclusive effects.  Dismis-
sal on a jurisdictional defense does not bar a second action in an ap-
propriate court that presents different jurisdictional issues.
  More to the point, 
common sense supports preclusion on the threshold issue:  to prevent 
a party—who chose the court that ruled against its own authority—
from litigating the same point repetitively.  So, for this limited pur-
pose, the dismissal is a valid judgment. 
87  Further, 
the initial court’s negative ruling on the jurisdictional issue should not 
have normal issue-preclusive effects in a later action, and so should 
not preclude some similar issue that arises on the merits of the same 
or any other claim.88  For such purposes, the prior judgment is invalid.  
After all, the initial court was supposed to be exercising only its juris-
diction to determine jurisdiction.89
 
85
See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(“[T]he Louisiana courts would be bound by our ruling that defendants had insuffi-
cient contacts with Louisiana to satisfy the federal due process clause requisites for per-
sonal jurisdiction.”); Eaton v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 1978) 
(“We must agree that the merits of the issue of personal jurisdiction over Volkswagen 
South was decided by the unappealed state court judgments and that they bar relitiga-
tion of the jurisdictional issue in the instant cases.”). 
  Many good reasons support such 
limits on preclusion, including not only the notion that limited juris-
86
See Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive Abstention:  Issue Preclusion and Jurisdic-
tional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 212-13 (2001) (discussing the Ar-
ticle III concerns inherent in rulings that have no preclusive effect). 
87
See Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 (1866). 
88
See, e.g., Anusbigian v. Trugreen/Chemlawn, Inc., 72 F.3d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 
1996) (“[C]ontrary to the plaintiff’s fear, expressed in his brief, that he might be forec-
losed from seeking damages in state court under the doctrines of res judicata or ‘law of 
the case,’ the remand order forecloses nothing except further litigation of his claim in 
federal court.”);  United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(“[A]lthough Ritchie’s clients were barred (after Judge Jarvis’s ruling) from relitigat-
ing whether their motion to quash could be heard before the IRS brought an en-
forcement action, Judge Hull was not bound by any factual findings made by Judge 
Jarvis for the limited purpose of considering the jurisdictional challenge . . . .”); By-
Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Armen-Berry can 
sue By-Prod and Schiff under Article 14 of the Illinois Criminal Code in an Illinois 
court, and that court will not be bound by our reading of the Illinois law of punitive 
damages.”).  But see, e.g., Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 245 
F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an issue decided in a personal jurisdic-
tion dismissal was preclusive on the merits in a second suit). 
89
See Idleman, supra note 83, at 57-63 (identifying carefully the outer bounds of a 
court’s inherent power to determine its own jurisdiction). 
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diction should yield limited effects, but also the fact that the truncated 
procedure for deciding jurisdiction weighs against carrying jurisdic-
tional determinations over to affect the merits.90
The main idea coming from the urge for preclusion and a sense 
for its limits is that a prior court lacking jurisdiction should be able to 
preclude little more than is absolutely necessary.  A dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction does not produce a generally valid judgment.  There-
fore, the rule emerges that the preclusive effect of jurisdiction to de-
termine no jurisdiction reaches no further than the precise issue of 
jurisdiction itself, so that a finding of no jurisdiction will not otherwise 
be binding in any other action.
 
91
A few corollaries follow from that basic rule.  A determination of 
no jurisdiction probably should not generate nonmutual preclusion.
 
92  
Nor should it work to establish, rather than defeat, the jurisdiction of 
the other court.93  For example, a finding that a federal court lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction because of the nonexistence of some fact 
critical to exclusive jurisdiction should not force a state court to accept 
jurisdiction.94  Even though this limit on preclusion might lead to awk-
ward situations,95
Additional arguments for this latter limit on preclusion might be 
(1) that the burden of proof for defeating jurisdiction is often lighter 
 extending the binding effect of the unempowered 
federal court’s dismissal appears unnecessary and hence improper. 
 
90
See Edney, supra note 86, at 206-22 (cataloging reasons). 
91
See Idleman, supra note 83, at 29 (approving limited preclusive effects); Edney, 
supra note 86, at 217-18 (noting the limited scope of the determination).  It is true that 
18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 83, § 4436, sounds more expansive:  “Although a dismis-
sal for lack of jurisdiction does not bar a second action as a matter of claim preclusion, 
it does preclude relitigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdiction 
question.”  But in fact the specific discussion and the cases Wright et al. cite conform 
to the idea that preclusion extends only to “the same issue of jurisdiction.”  Id. at n.3.  
But see id. at n.16 (noting the collateral effect of jurisdictional determinations). 
92
See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 83, § 4436 (agreeing on the basis of the “im-
portance and sensitivity of jurisdictional limits”). 
93
R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 657 n.10 (2d Cir. 
1979), abrogated on other grounds, Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).  But see 
Roth v. McAllister Bros., 316 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[A] tribunal always pos-
sesses jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction, and any fact upon which that decision 
is grounded may serve as the basis for an estoppel by judgment in any later action.”). 
94
Cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 645-47 (2006) (stating that 
“[w]hile the state court cannot review the decision to remand in an appellate way, it is 
perfectly free to reject the remanding court’s reasoning,” but basing the refusal to es-
tablish jurisdiction by preclusion on the inability to obtain federal appellate review of 
the remand). 
95
See Julie Fukes Stewart, Note, “Litigation Is Not Ping-Pong,” Except When It Is:  Re-
solving the Westfall Act’s Circularity Problem, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1022-25 (2010) 
(describing cases that bounce between removal and remand). 
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than the burden of proof for establishing jurisdiction, and issue prec-
lusion does not apply when the burden increases,96 and (2) that estab-
lishing jurisdiction would usually work to the detriment of the defen-
dant, and issue preclusion normally does not bind the victorious 
party.97  These additional arguments are not determinative, however, 
because the rules of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction might be 
specially tailored and need not conform to those of issue preclusion.98
The jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine is, however, 
not in all respects narrower than issue preclusion.  The law’s capability 
to shape this special preclusion doctrine also can broaden it.  For ex-
ample, by virtue of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction, an unre-
viewable remand for lack of removal jurisdiction might preclude a 
subsequent federal action on the same cause,
 
99 even though an inabili-
ty to obtain appellate review usually defeats issue preclusion.100
IV.  ANALOGIZING JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION  
TO CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 
Personal jurisdiction authorizes rendering a judgment with prec-
lusive effect.  Indeed, jurisdiction over the person is a prerequisite to 
giving certain remedies, such as enjoining that person from suing 
elsewhere.101
By contrast, preclusion refers to binding someone to the outcome 
of a prior case.  The extent of preclusion finds specification through 
the law of res judicata.  Res judicata thus defines what the judgment 
decided for the parties and their privies.
 
102
Personal jurisdiction and preclusion of privies are different con-
cepts.  Jurisdiction is possible without privity,
 
103 and privity can exist 
without jurisdiction.104
 
96
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982). 
  The line for personal jurisdiction over absentees 
97
See supra note 22 (collecting sources). 
98
See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
99
See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 83, § 4436 (“Preclusion on the jurisdiction 
question should apply both on a subsequent attempt to remove and to an independent 
federal filing.”). 
100
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982). 
101
See CLERMONT, supra note 7, §§ 4.2, 5.1(B)(1), 5.7(B). 
102
See id. § 5.1(A)(1). 
103
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34(3) (1982) (providing that 
a person who is neither party nor privy is beyond preclusion, which would be true even 
if personal jurisdiction would have existed). 
104
See, e.g., id. §§ 43–44 (providing that a successor in interest to property is a privy 
with respect to a judgment determining his predecessor’s interest in that property, 
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tends to coincide with substantive due process,105 while policy draws 
the privity line well short of procedural due process’s requirement of 
adequate representation.106
Nevertheless, personal jurisdiction and preclusion of privies have 
a similar flavor and turn on similar considerations.  Personal jurisdic-
tion over absentees in a class action and preclusion of them are pecu-
liarly similar notions.  The similarity suffices to confuse some courts 
into mixing them together when discussing a Baycol-type problem.
 
107
In certain class action settings, the two concepts begin to merge.  
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts recognized that personal jurisdiction is 
normally a prerequisite for valid judgment, which is in turn a prere-
quisite for preclusion.
 
108  But the Court further provided, in the con-
text of a certified class action for damages, that adequately represented 
absentees who received notice and had rights to participate and to opt 
out were sufficiently subject to personal jurisdiction to authorize a 
binding judgment on the merits.109
Shutts suggests the analogy.  A denial of personal jurisdiction in an 
ordinary lawsuit works much the same as denial of class certification, 
because the latter announces that the court will not exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the absentees.  Finding no jurisdiction means the 
court will not issue a valid judgment that supports preclusion.  Similar-
ly, denying class certification means the absentees are strangers un-
  That is, certain procedures en-
sured enough protection to justify both jurisdiction and preclusion. 
 
which would be true even for a yet unborn successor not subject to personal jurisdic-
tion). 
105
See CLERMONT, supra note 7, §§ 4.2(B)(1), 4.2(C)(1). 
106
See supra text accompanying notes 50-54. 
107
See, e.g., supra note 38 (describing the Eighth Circuit’s Baycol discussion).  The 
parties’ briefs did not help the court untangle the two issues.  The defendant phrased 
its central argument as follows:  “Because Appellants’ Interests Were Fully and Ade-
quately Represented, They Are Bound In Personam by the Denial of Class Certification . 
. . .”  Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 29, at iv.   In the Supreme Court, the de-
fendant did untangle the issues, arguing:  “As Adequately Represented Unnamed Par-
ties in McCollins, Petitioners Are Bound by the Denial of Class Certification.”  Brief for 
Respondent, supra note 29, at iii.  The plaintiffs left it a muddle:  “Both Due Process 
and Preclusion Principles Are Violated by Binding Absent Class Members to a Decision 
Denying Class Certification Because They Have Never Received Any Notice or an Op-
portunity to be Heard or to Opt Out.”  Brief for Petitioners at iii, Smith v. Bayer Corp., 
131 S. Ct. 61 (2010) (No. 09-1205). 
108
472 U.S. 797, 820-23 (1985) (ruling, in a state plaintiff-class action seeking 
money damages for claimants from all over the country and abroad, that the Kansas 
court could not apply Kansas law to class members’ claims unrelated to Kansas and 
that absent class members need not otherwise be subject to effective service of process 
as long as they received notice and had rights to participate and to opt out). 
109
See Woolley, supra note 22, at 959-75. 
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bound by any judgment in the lawsuit.  Therefore, just as the deter-
mination of no personal jurisdiction means that there will be little to 
no preclusive effect from the judgment, a denial of class certification 
means that normally there will be no preclusion as to the class. 
Yet, a determination of no personal jurisdiction will have a preclu-
sive effect, albeit a very limited one.  The jurisdiction-to-determine-no-
jurisdiction doctrine stands for the proposition that lack of the nor-
mally required personal jurisdiction will not prevent a judgment bind-
ing only on the issue of no jurisdiction.  In making a determination 
that it lacks jurisdiction, a court is indicating that it has enough hold 
of the parties to say authoritatively that it has no jurisdiction.  The 
court can say that with binding effect, even though it in fact lacks ju-
risdiction to render a valid judgment on the merits.  It can thereby ac-
complish something by its holding and avoid repetitive litigation of 
the exact same issue of jurisdiction. 
If a court without jurisdiction can bind someone to a finding that 
jurisdiction is lacking, a court without authority of a comparable sort 
should be able to bind someone to a finding that authority is lacking.  
The denial of class certification is a comparable determination of no 
authority—arguably it is the only comparable determination of no au-
thority, besides failure to give adequate notice—in that it announces 
that there will be no valid judgment as to the absent class members.110
Therefore, a finding of no certification should preclude in the 
same way that a finding of no jurisdiction precludes.  Moreover, giving 
such preclusive effect would serve the same policies of effectuating the 
holding and avoiding repetitive litigation.  Still, the effect should be 
limited to binding only on the factual and legal issues that generated 
the no-certification ruling if they arise in a repeated attempt to certify. 
  
In other words, the term “jurisdiction” in the name of the jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine means authority prerequisite to validity. 
Cutting against the analogy is that the determination of no juris-
diction over the defendant binds the ordinary plaintiff, over whom the 
court in fact has personal jurisdiction.111
 
110
Cf. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (viewing class certifica-
tion as a matter of statutory standing); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
612 (1997) (treating class certification as “logically antecedent” to jurisdiction). 
  In the class action setting, 
the aim is instead to bind a noncertified class absentee.  The response 
is fourfold.  The first two arguments address the jurisdictional side of 
111
See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (holding that the institution of 
a lawsuit subjected the plaintiff to personal jurisdiction for a transactionally related 
counterclaim). 
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the analogy, while the next two speak to the class action side.  Togeth-
er they establish that whether the person whom the jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine precludes was subject to personal 
jurisdiction is irrelevant to determining by analogy the preclusive ef-
fect of a denial of class certification. 
First, the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine might 
provide a better analogy than the no-jurisdiction doctrine.  When a 
court erroneously determines that it has personal jurisdiction, that 
finding will bind the defendant over whom the court by hypothesis 
has no personal jurisdiction.  Personal jurisdiction over the bound 
party is not a sine qua non.  Second, even the jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine gives courts without jurisdiction 
the power to preclude parties.  A court that determines it has no sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction will bind the plaintiff on that point.  No form 
of jurisdiction with respect to the bound party is a prerequisite. 
Third, even if Shutts requires a strange breed of personal jurisdic-
tion over absent plaintiffs to bind them on the merits of a class judg-
ment for damages, that case did not address any requirements for ju-
risdiction to determine no jurisdiction.  A court denying certification, 
but having properly conducted a class action to that point, will have 
afforded the absentees some procedural protections—albeit mainly 
through representation, rather than by notice, participation, or opt-
out safeguards.  In fact, one could read the Bridgestone/Firestone line of 
cases as ruling that there was therefore sufficient jurisdiction with re-
spect to adequately represented absentees, especially in a federal 
court, to bind them to the denial of class certification.  Fourth, as al-
ready noted, the system can preclude privies not subject to personal ju-
risdiction at all.112
In sum, the analogy may not be perfect, but it seems strong 
enough to conclude that a finding that no class exists should be as 
binding as a finding that no jurisdiction exists.  The Bridges-
tone/Firestone progeny therefore could adopt the proposition that certi-
fication of a class action is not necessary to render a judgment valid 
enough to bind absentees only on the determination of no certification. 
  The central question is whether the law should 
choose to treat the class action absentees as privies.  The answer does 
not definitively turn on whether personal jurisdiction over them exists. 
 
112
See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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V.  A CLASS ACTION’S PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS 
Our law permits an action to be brought by or against named par-
ties as representatives of a class of absent persons similarly situated.  
The judgment in such a class action binds all persons included within 
the class, not just those named as parties.113  Class members normally 
cannot relitigate matters the class representatives have litigated.114  To 
ensure the adequacy of the representation and thereby to obviate the 
nonjoined class members’ need for an independent day in court, class 
action rules commonly require, as does Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23(a), that the court prospectively test commonality, typicality, 
and representation by deciding at the outset whether to certify the 
case as a class action.  Appropriate notice to class members may be re-
quired, although it is usually not necessary that a class member actual-
ly receive notice in order to be bound by the judgment.  On collateral 
attack, an absent class member can attack a class action judgment’s 
binding effect not only on the usual grounds of lack of jurisdiction 
and procedural due process, but also by raising the due process ques-
tion of inadequate representation of the class members’ interests.115
 
113
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 cmt. e (1982) (noting the 
binding effect provided adequacy is found); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 
 
3, at 161-
63 (explaining the extension of preclusion to class members); 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., su-
pra note 54, § 1789 (exploring the effect of a judgment in a class action); Andrew S. 
Tulumello & Mark Whitburn, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Issues in Class Litigation, 
in A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 49, at 605, 606-07 (detailing 
these rules); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 717, 721-22 (2005) (suggesting the difficulties with applying preclusion in the 
class setting).  Such res judicata follows only a valid judgment in a certified class action.  
It does not provide for preclusion by the affirmative certification decision within the 
original class action suit itself.  See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 
305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Although the district court’s findings for the purpose of class 
certification are conclusive on that topic, they do not bind the fact-finder on the me-
rits.”); Clermont, supra note 1, at 39-40 (explaining that “there simply is no doctrine of 
intrasuit res judicata”). 
114
Of course, complications exist.  For preclusion to take effect, the claims must 
be the same in the class action and the later individual action.  See Cooper v. Fed. Re-
serve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984) (refusing to preclude absent class members from 
pursuing different claims in individual actions); 5 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEW-
BERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 16:21–:22 (4th ed. 2002) (noting absentees can 
bring individual actions on issues that a class could not have raised).  And nonmutuali-
ty must be extended to absentees gingerly.  See Germonprez v. Dir. of Selective Serv., 
318 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1970) (applying preclusion); 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra, 
§§ 16:27–:30 (illustrating the possible unfairness to the defendant of allowing new 
claims to be litigated using collateral estoppel by absentees). 
115
See supra note 14. 
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This Essay, however, does not treat such matters.  It concerns in-
stead the binding effect of a would-be class action that the court re-
fuses to certify.  The decisions implicit in a no-certification ruling have 
a binding effect in any attempt to sue again in a court where the exact 
same issue arises.  Of course, the named parties may find themselves 
bound under the ordinary rules of res judicata.116
By contrast, the decision not to certify should carry no other prec-
lusive effects.  Although, just as for the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-
jurisdiction doctrine,
  Additionally, and 
less ordinarily, preclusion may extend to the absentees, who would 
thus be in privity with the class representatives for that limited pur-
pose.  By analogy to the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doc-
trine, the absentees would face preclusion if the exact same issue 
arose when they sought certification elsewhere. 
117 courts might sometimes embrace preclusion 
too enthusiastically, they are thereby disassociating the limited preclu-
sion from its narrow rationale.  For example, a court might conceiva-
bly incline toward binding decertified absentees on the merits.  That 
would be going too far.  There should be no preclusion on the me-
rits.118
Analogizing this class action question to the jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine bears significant benefits.  It sug-
gests a path to preclusion that avoids the natural judicial reluctance to 
augment the categories of privies.  It reaches the result of preclusion 
on certification denial, a result policy suggests and the weight of 
precedent accepts.  Almost as importantly, the analogy brings with it 
all the limits on preclusion associated with the jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine. 
  The denial of certification makes the absentee a stranger to the 
action for all other purposes. 
 
116
See, e.g., Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1012 (8th Cir. 2002) (involv-
ing same named plaintiffs repetitively bringing class actions). 
117
See Clermont, supra note 1, at 24-25 (discussing the complexities of intersystem 
preclusion in jurisdictional determinations). 
118
See, e.g., Muhammad v. Giant Food Inc., 108 F. App’x 757, 765 n.5 (4th Cir. 
2004) (observing, when affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of the em-
ployer on each of the employees’ individual claims and the declaration of mootness on 
a pending class-certification motion:  “While the rejection of the named employees’ 
individual claims is binding as to those employees, it does not preclude later efforts to 
certify a class action against Giant or bar any individual claims that might be asserted 
in such an action.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
A denial of certification yields a judgment valid, with respect to 
the adequately represented absentees, for the very limited purpose of 
preclusion on the same issue of certification.  This preclusion works 
just like the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine.  Thus, 
it will defeat certification in any attempt to sue again in a court where 
the exact same issue arises, but it will have no wider preclusive effects. 
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